filing of the original plan, which was filed on February 18th of 2010. And that provides that the action against WestLB would be dismissed with prejudice if the committee did not object to the plan. So parties looking at this, Park City I would have known and should have known that nothing could be expected from the litigation if the committee was satisfied before the original plan was filed.

The committee supported the original plan. The committee supported this plan. That is no change for the expectations of Park City and the other ultimate equity plan holders since the first plan was filed.

In addition, your Honor, this is completely appropriate of the committee because the status of that action is such that WestLB has never filed an answer. And as your Honor knows, under Rule 7041(a), the plaintiff can dismiss without even a court order as long as no responsive pleading had been filed. So that's been out there. It was appropriately out is there.

Third, there is no claim unless the equity and capital structure above the debtor at Mezzanine and Holding are satisfied. And as the Court has heard, the -- with the claim of Bay North in excess

of 11 million -- maybe up to 44 million, as was discussed today -- it is not reasonable that any distribution should be expected at that level.

And the fourth thing is the evidence supporting the 9019 settlement with WestLB has been presented unrebutted, and it shows the standards, the Copexa standards have been met. It -- those standards were gone by -- clearly, in the testimony of Mr. Elliott, this is in the best interest of the creditors as demonstrated by the evidence and the committees' support of this -- this settlement.

There is -- there was no objection when the original release was given to WestLB under the cash collateral order eight months ago. There was no objection by these ultimate equity holders when the committee was given standing to look into and pursue any causes against WestLB, and there is no evidence to support that the committee did not exercise reasonably their review and consideration of Copexa standards in settling this case.

And as a practical matter, it comes down to the fact that if you look at the settlement, WestLB is paying four and a half million dollars in new money. It's compromising its claim for less than the full amount of its claim, and it's allowing

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

unsecured creditors, if they are paid over time, to be paid a hundred cents on the dollar before they are paid. It is just very clear that the 9019 standard has been met.

Dealing then with the issue of the third party releases, I think the other objections raised by Park City have been adequately addressed by Mr. Blumenthal in his arguments, but just touching on the third-party releases, they raised the specter of third-party releases, but there are no third-party releases in this plan. If you look at the Western Real Estate Fund case, the Tenth Circuit case, which, you know, prescribes third-party releases, this does not fit under that situation. That prescribes releases required involuntarily through the plan, and those would be releases by somebody other than the debtor, of a party other than the debtor and that is not occurring here. If you go through the releases, Section 11.2 is a release by the debtor only with respect to defined claims. It is not a third-party release. Section 11.3 is an exculpation clause which mirrors 1125, which is completely appropriate. Section 11.4 is a release of WestLB as part of the compromise supported under Rule 9019, and it is only from estate causes of action. It is entirely

appropriate. And as I stated, the evidence supporting it is unrebutted.

Then Section 11.5 is the injunction, and this mirrors 524. Again, completely appropriate and allowed under the code. And, in fact, to be even more careful, that section says that that injunction is only allowed to the fullest extent authorized or provided by the bankruptcy code. So clearly nothing that is not allowed by the bankruptcy code, you know, is included in this plan.

And based on these arguments, on the evidence presented, and on the fact that this party has no standing, we would ask the Court to overrule those objections.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jenkins?

# CLOSING ARGUMENT

## BY MR. JENKINS:

Your Honor, just very briefly, and I will not retread the ground Ms. Jarvis tread already with respect to the settlement. I just wanted to make a concluding comment that with respect to the response that the committee filed, that as we put on the record earlier, there has been a resolution of that

issue reached, and that re-electing or reconsideration of certain Class 4 creditors will be allowed and the terms that were stated, that Mr. Havel stated are acceptable to the committee.

There was one matter that we raised in our pleading that we filed last Thursday which was not addressed today, and that was our second point, which indicated that we believe that the debtor should have -- or WestLB should have to increase the amount of its allocable cash to make payments to Class 4 unsecured creditors who elect on the effective date -- to take the effective date payment. The resolution we reached on the voting issue or the re-electing issue has resolved that and mooted that issue, that the economics of the plan remain the same as currently stated in the plan supplement.

And just as a final matter, with respect to the settlement that Ms. Jarvis touched on, this is a settlement that is embodied in a plan under Section 1123(b)(3), which does provide that a plan can compromise or adjust claims held by the debtor or by the estate. Whether or not the Copexa standard applies to such settlements when they are embodied in a plan was something that the Court raised and, frankly, something I was scratching my head over.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

156

It, indeed, turns out based on a review of the case law that the Copexa standard or something similar to it is appropriately applied to a settlement even when it's brought within a plan of reorganization, as opposed to a separate 9019 settlement.

But looking at the standards, which are very similar, the Court's charge is still the same, and that is the Court doesn't need to determine the issues. The Court doesn't need to try the issues. What the Court needs to do or is charged to do is to canvass the settlement and determine -- canvass the issues and determine whether the settlement falls above the lowest point in the range of reasonableness. That is the standard and it's a fairly flexible standard, of course. And I would submit to your Honor that the settlement that we proposed here in the plan where the litigation will be dismissed in exchange for essentially full payment to unsecured creditors if they so elect, or a discounted payment on the effective date, certainly falls well within and well above that lowest point of the range of reasonableness.

As the undisputed testimony which was proffered of Mr. Elliott showed, there was certainly some uncertainty as to the likelihood of the success

in this. It's a complicated lawsuit, which would have fact-intensive issues. The issues would certainly be expensive to litigate. And as Mr. Elliott's testimony indicated, WestLB is represented by very aggressive and competent counsel who no doubt would very vigorously defend the lawsuit.

Finally, second -- or, I'm sorry -- on the issue of the collectability of the judgment, while that issue was not foremost in the committee's consideration, certainly the collectability, with WestLB being a bank and there really being no affirmative claim for money damages, made that issue certainly less prevalent, less dominant in the consideration.

And finally, the settlement must take account of the best interests of creditors, giving due deference to their reasonable views. I would submit in this case, in this situation, unlike a typical 9019 settlement which is brought by the trustee or a debtor where the creditors are being asked to express their views, in this situation, the creditors have, indeed, expressed their views and as the creditors that have entered into the settlement and fully support that settlement.

And on that basis, your Honor, we would ask the Court to approve the settlement as it's embodied in the plan and confirm this plan. Thank you, your Honor.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Wilson?

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

BY MR. WILSON:

Thank you, your Honor. Counsel have been fair and concise and I'll try to do the same.

**CLOSING ARGUMENT** 

This objection, the objection of the Wickline parties, centers really on a couple of things and I'll focus there, but they reverberate throughout the case and the matters that the Court is required to consider as it considers confirmation of a claim.

The -- it has become abundantly clear that Mr. Wickline and Mr. Shoaf had a falling out as business associates. I believe the parties have understood generally that it's not this Court's problem, and so we have not burdened the Court except in a very general sense with the details or issues relating to that. But the existence of that and some of the conduct pertaining to that is relevant to this

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

confirmation proceeding and the plan that is before the Court.

First of all, the evidence is that Mr. Wickline's interests were -- in August of last year, his interest in Management were through certain corporate or entity actions. He was basically frozen out of Management from that point on. But what that means is that Mr. Shoaf, who stayed on and who continued and continues to have managerial responsibility for this debtor and other entities within the organization, does not -- having effected an expulsion, is not able to expel fiduciary duties as he acts for the entities, and particularly the debtor entity here. And there are issues relating to the Management and Development claims that are here, and I'll speak to those as briefly as I can. basically, it is apparent that Mr. Shoaf will not, with confirmation of this plan, leave that all behind but he remains on and has significant future involvement with this debtor -- employment for a period of two years at \$240,000 per year, the -however, the unique term of that employment agreement relates to the transfer of licenses. We submit that it is mostly about the liquor licenses. There has been some effort to obscure that with some other

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

160

But may I just call the Court's attention licenses. on that issue to just a couple of things in the employment agreement? And that is, there seems to be a significant focus upon the liquor licenses themselves and this is where I would like to focus the Court. It's on Exhibit 2. It is the plan. page 22. It's paragraph 7.2. I think it gives proper perspective to the role of the liquor license that's here. Paragraph 7.2, paragraph small b, "Continuing use of liquor licenses on or after the effective date, providing acceptable employment agreements agreed upon and entered into between Shoaf and the organized debtor," and "Shoaf and the reorganized debtor will facilitate a transition under which the reorganized debtor will have the ability to use liquor licenses currently used in the debtor's operations." There is no other reference to anything else there with regard to other licenses.

The conduct of Mr. Shoaf with regard to that -- and the evidence is this, that the applications were made. Jointly, Mr. Wickline and Mr. Shoaf were the responsible principals. The documentary evidence related to one license, however, the testimony related to that license, of which there are several, relating to this, the testimony of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Mr. Shoaf, and so the documentary evidence is just indicative of, I think, the situation with the other licenses. And that is that Mr. Shoaf, through his unilateral conduct in the renewal process, the licenses were held by Management, and they are still held by Management today. Those licenses have two more days to go. But the Court will see on W-2 that Mr. Shoaf lined out and acknowledged that he lined out the entity that holds the licenses and substituted not one that he owned and controlled only half of, but he put in and substituted an entity which he, himself, totally controls. Unilateral conduct. Why did he do that? 240,000 big dollars is why he did that because he has bargained for a handy bonus if he can assure continuity and deliver those licenses, and that required him to take unilateral action to garner them all for his own name -- all in his own name and under his control so that he can effect whatever he needs to do to win this \$240,000.

A couple of things, he's going to stay on. He's going to get 20 grand a month for two years. That is pretty good pay, given his involvement with a failed organization. If that is not enough and that would be -- one would expect that in the performance of those rather ordinary duties at that rather

unordinary compensation level that he would do whatever he needed to do to protect the interests of the entity, but what he is doing is, in addition to that compensation is, he has taken steps to unilaterally wrestle control of a significant asset. And we all agree that you cannot sell liquor licenses, except that here we are not selling them. All we are doing is unilaterally exercising control over them, and then we are not going to sell them; we are going to market our services for a huge bonus to deliver them, and of course it was negotiated with his counsel and the debtors here.

But it's -- that alone, in addition to the compensation of the other \$480,000 -- all told, a package of \$720,000 that Mr. Shoaf gets as a reward in this case is -- plus some perks, some additional things that he gets based on some further sales and so forth down the road -- is just really, amazingly enough, about what he would get, should the Development and Management claims have been paid in full. Well, that is a fact and I think I'll not say more other than this is how -- this is what plays into the objection, and it goes to the other -- to the other issues here. The plan must be submitted and paid. The debtor is Partners. The manager of

debtor is Shoaf. This is what Shoaf did. This is what the plan provides for Shoaf. Is that good faith? We submit that it is not, under these circumstances.

Let's turn just very quickly to the Management and the Development claims. WestLB has presented and we have not -- we have not objected to admission, nor do we take issue with the existence of the two subordination agreements. We appreciate sometimes what hearings are all about is, especially on these hurry-up ones, is you get to see what the evidence is. They are there. They are probably standard. Their terms are what they are. Wickline submits, the Wickline interests submit, that the subordination agreement is unenforceable for these relatively easily articulated provisions, and I'll just state that I think we've all read 510, and it does make a specific reference to that in the subordination agreements.

Here is why we submit that it is not enforceable in this case, and it is a contract. And it can only be enforced in accordance with ordinary contract principles. Contracts are subject to defense. Point one. When WestLB was a creditor, a fellow creditor, Management and Development and

WestLB and Bay North were just creditors. They were just plain old creditors, and their rights were determined. This Court is called upon to determine rights and priorities all day, every day. When WestLB chose to become -- instead of filing its own plan -- when it chose to become a plan proponent and joined with this debtor as a co-plan proponent, it -- the character of its involvement changed, I'd submit, from just a plain old creditor to a plan proponent, and it joins in and shares the duties of the debtor of submitting a plan in good faith.

And this plan with this treatment of Mr. Shoaf and the honoring of him through this \$720,000 compensation package, based on his conduct to wrestle away, in contrary to his fiduciary duties, the assets of Management, like it or not, WestLB becomes a partner with the debtor and shares good faith in there, and we submit there is not good faith in that regard.

And we have submitted further arguments with regard to the contractual defenses of -- independent from the bankruptcy code. These are ordinary contractual obligations -- the obligations of good faith and fair dealing, which is written in every contract; you just have to sprinkle lemon juice

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

on it to see its words, but it's there in every contract in America. And we submit that again because of the partnership that has now been formed basically and as plan proponents, that WestLB share somewhat in the conduct of Mr. Shoaf because they honor it under this plan. And the same arguments are made with regard to the state law arguments of failure to mitigate.

We had a little exchange with Mr. Robertson, and I'm not sure I'm precisely clear on how that all shook out, but what is apparent is that WestLB or a bad bank -- it's probably a bad bank -- through its servicer, WestLB, proposes to come out of this plan wearing two hats: Lender with the notes and equity holder. Out in the world of -out in the world outside bankruptcy merger of interests is a principle that the -- which means that WestLB walks away with everything. They get all the In this case, we submit that under the circumstances, that WestLB could have and should have, and the law should deem that, that the predicate to enforcement of the subordination agreements have not been met because that treatment constitutes the payment in full of the plan. That is our legal position. We have submitted legal

authorities to the Court. We submit it without further argument on the matter.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I have one additional point and then I'll be pleased to sit down. And it has to do with the -- I'm taking the prerogative of ignoring the note he just passed me.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

MR. WILSON: We all agree. It comes with getting a little gray hair.

The final point really has to do with procedural issues. The bankruptcy code, we just deal with procedure all day, every day on matters. Number one, it has been pointed out and will be again that no greater than 50 percent of equity is -- appears in this courtroom and objects. We all know where equity fits in the world of bankruptcy. We always give it a little piggy statement to my clients, and they get numbered and the last little piggy is always equity and that will never change. But the way this thing has unfolded is very unusual and this has been rushed at the Court real fast, and I'm not sure that, at least in my experience, I have seen its equal where a plan was proposed, a disclosure statement was approved, a solicitation period was given and voting was done. And then -- and then we got a different

plan and everybody likes to say it's really the same, but it's materially different in significant ways. At least two of the ways is that a million six in claims just got jettisoned under the new plan, and a principal of the debtor just got a promise of \$720,000-plus out of the deal. Those are kind of material.

The problem is that we have now rushed to this, and we are confirming this on solicitations of a different plan. Procured votes, procured on a different plan under a different timeline, and then all of a sudden we get this new plan, and I'm not going to say eight days, but someone else might, on this thing.

May I just submit one consideration?

Don't the body of creditors get to have a say? There is \$720,000 new in this deal. We learned about it when the plan supplement was filed, and then we all just kind of scrambled and we've tried to respond to it. But these votes are solicited and now we find there are \$720,000 that could be -- that could go to different creditors.

THE COURT: Well, why do you suggest that the \$720,000 can go to other creditors, Mr. Wilson?

MR. WILSON: WestLB is willing to pay it

```
1
      somehow.
 2
                  THE COURT: Well, for services, aren't
 3
      they?
 4
                  MR. WILSON: Well, services or whatever it
 5
      has to take to --
 6
                  THE COURT: Well, one of the --
 7
                  MR. WILSON: -- sell something you can't
8
      sell.
9
                  THE COURT: There is no question that the
10
      Circumstances of this case are unique and unusual.
11
                  MR. WILSON: Oh, certainly.
12
                  THE COURT: And this is coming to the
13
      Court very quickly. I guess the question that I have
14
      for your clients is, other than the fact that you've
15
      had to scramble and you object to the plan, is there
16
      an articulable prejudice, a fundamental denial of due
17
      process to your client if the Court makes a ruling?
18
                  MR. WILSON: Let me answer that as best I
19
      can and very quickly. The Wickline interests are 38
20
      and a half -- 38 and three-quarters percent. As
21
      such, it's equity. And this is the reorganization
22
      process and they're interested in the process and in
23
      the payment and treatment of the claims. And those
      who --
24
25
                  THE COURT: Well, how was equity treated
```

under the first plan?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I'm talking about -- I'm MR. WILSON: trying to answer that. The answer is, equity has been out of the running, I think, in all plans. I'll make my point and the Court can respond in its ruling to it. And that is, the pecuniary interest --I don't think there is any difference between plan one and plan two as far as the equity. I'm talking about the 38 and three-quarters percent. And we make no claim for that and it would be foolish and naive for to us do that. But when you're equity, that doesn't mean that you cannot be concerned for the outcome in the interest of everybody else. The -- it is of vital interest that the process work, that the plan that is presented to the Court be a plan that is submitted in good faith and based on good faith treatment and good faith conduct and that is a point. I'm not talking about -- the only way the Wickline interest would be entitled to participate in any way beyond David's personal claim for \$4,600 -- and I don't speak to that except in a very general way -but the only way the Wickline interest would be able to participate would be through the million six, and of course that is a whole different set of arguments, but that doesn't mean that the Wickline interests are

not vitally interested in the outcome of the case for everybody. And that requires good faith -- bankruptcy good faith in terms of the submission of the plan -- good faith treatment of the creditors and we would submit that there is a -- sort of a last-minute interjection of a \$720,000 component here that the parties have not had an opportunity to fully consider and comment upon, do discovery upon, and vote upon. If this were a Chapter 13 case involving an old car and a couple of credit cards and a couple of medical bills and we had this kind of a notice problem, we'd re-notice it.

I think that concludes our comments. The Court has been very liberal with its time and patience. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Hofmann?

## CLOSING ARGUMENT

# BY MR. HOFMANN:

Thank you, your Honor. I would echo, and hopefully without repeating too much of what Mr. Wilson said with respect to the importance of notice and opportunity to be heard on this matter.

Notice is the cornerstone of the bankruptcy code and I think that due process has not been met in this

1 case. 2 THE COURT: So how has your client been 3 prejudiced, Mr. Hofmann? 4 MR. HOFMANN: The plan that was on file up 5 until -- I don't want to say days ago. I think it 6 was days ago last Friday -- did not provide for a 7 release of the claims against WestLB. This plan 8 does. The Court has had --9 THE COURT: Well, it does. 10 wouldn't -- the prejudice that I'm really focusing on 11 is, how has the shortened notice affected your 12 client's ability to address that issue? How it's affected it is, had 13 MR. HOFMANN: 14 there been -- a normal plan process that is 15 contemplated by the rules, it's 56 days. You see a 16 plan coming a mile and a half off. And 56 days ago, 17 had a plan been filed that says, "We are going to 18 release the committee's claims and the estate's 19 claims against WestLB, then my client would have had 20 a reasonable opportunity to explore and assess those 21 claims through Rule 2004 motions, through other 22 discovery procedures, and my client did not have that 23 opportunity. 24 The Court has observed my questioning of 25 the various witnesses, including Mr. Shoaf and

Mr. Robertson. And I did the best I could for my client under the circumstances, but it has to be the Court's clear observation that my questioning would have been more effective had there been a reasonable and normal amount of notice provided of these proceedings, which there was not. I had no idea what Mr. Shoaf or Mr. Robertson were going to say on the stand here today. Given 56 days' notice, I think there would have been quite possibly different proceedings before the Court in the last two days of this confirmation hearing.

In addition, your Honor, I would say that myself and my firm have done the best we can under these circumstances to read and understand the various agreements that are being tossed about, but the plan is changing on a daily basis. The plan was modified today in significant respects. When the Court heard counsel for WestLB state, "Well, these are the additional modifications to the plan," that did not even exist last week.

On the -- the confirmation hearing obviously started last Friday. On Thursday night late, as usual, there is a plan supplement filed that materially changes the terms, and I'll throw out one striking example and there are doubtless others. The

plan supplement that was filed last Thursday night provided that WestLB's -- their commitment to fund was no longer conditional. That, of course, benefits the estate. But I prepared an objection on behalf of my client based on the plan supplement that existed just two days before. And by the way, just two days before the objection deadline. So it's a moving target, your Honor, and I'm doing the best for my client to read these very, very, very voluminous filings that the debtors made and reacting, but I don't think it's been sufficient notice under the circumstances. This is too important.

Now, can be no doubt that in the appropriate case, this Court has the equitable power to shorten notice as is necessary under the circumstances. If this estate were a truck full of rotting strawberries, there is no doubt this Court could shorten the time and make sure those strawberries were preserved for the benefit of creditors before they go rotten. But I'd ask the Court, what is the reason -- what is the reason we are here on these emergency circumstances? And I would submit that it's an emergency of WestLB's own making. What WestLB has done is they have tightened the spigot of cash on this debtor and this estate.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

They said, "We are done funding this estate. Good luck to you. You can take our way or the highway."

And guess what? The debtor took WestLB's way. I don't think there can be any great surprise in that.

Your Honor, this plan is very different in material respects from the plan that was filed and submitted in February, together with the disclosure statement that was approved on February 25th. plan had a couple more million dollars of funding going into the estate. That plan did not have a release of the committee's claims and the estate's claims against WestLB. This plan has those two things and also has the allowance of WestLB's claim in a particular amount. These are all material, very material aspects of the plan, your Honor. they weren't material, then why are they being proposed? They are needed -- the plan proponents require these changes. Consider this by analogy. If in February, that plan on file in February had been approved by this Court, had been confirmed, and then this different plan, and questionably a different plan that is before the Court today had been submitted as a modification of the plan, would the Court require that there be a re-solicitation of the votes that approved the February plan? Or would the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Court say, "Well, there is nothing materially different in this plan. Therefore, I'm not going to require a re-solicitation"? I think that that is really the question before the Court this afternoon.

Your Honor, it's basic that a plan proponent and a plan must be proposed in good faith, and I don't think this one is. This plans provides for a release of estate's claims against WestLB, and this debtor is in bankruptcy court only because of the wrongful acts of WestLB. And I would ask the Court to contrast the evidence that it's heard through WestLB and through Mr. Shoaf and through the committee with what they said before back in February and before. Look at the disclosure statement. at how the debtor described WestLB's conduct at that Look at the committees' Complaint against WestLB. Compare that to the committee's position I think one of those two positions are too incongruous to mesh, and I think the explanation is simple. WestLB destroyed this debtor's business, forced this debtor into bankruptcy. The testimony of WestLB's representative --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hofmann, isn't another explanation the fact that complaints often contain simple allegations that have to be proven?

MR. HOFMANN: There is no doubt about it. There is no doubt about that. There are allegations in the Complaint that, if proven, would lead one to believe that there are substantial claims of this estate against WestLB, and it's not just the debtor, it's the committee that made even stronger allegations.

THE COURT: Well, but they've made -- according to you, changed their position today and I didn't quite gather, but I -- well, I don't know if it was clear, but I thought you might be suggesting that the committee was acting in bad faith.

MR. HOFMANN: I'm not suggesting that the committee was acting in bad faith, and the committee is not a plan proponent in any event. The debtor and WestLB are.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOFMANN: Your Honor, I think there is evidence that through the disclosure statement and through the filed Complaint of the committee that the estate has substantial claims against WestLB, and the estate, through the committee -- the committee purported to act on behalf of the estate, and I think the committee had authority -- sought not only the subordination of WestLB's claims, but the recovery of

the estate's claims against WestLB as a fraudulent transfer. If that purpose were achieved, where would we be? The estate would be free to pursue its claims against WestLB, which would undoubtedly be very substantial under the facts of this case.

Is there 100 percent likelihood of success against WestLB? Certainly not. I would agree that the facts are complicated here. But my client had a chance, your Honor. My client had an opportunity to recover, where now there -- if this plan is confirmed, there will be no chance for equity recovery.

THE COURT: Well, what opportunity would your client have?

MR. HOFMANN: The opportunity would be through the affirmative claims the estate would recover against WestlB, which would become property of the estate after the fraudulent transfer were avoided as requested by the committee -- the pursuit of those claims.

THE COURT: Well, how would those claims ultimately result in any recovery down the line for your client?

MR. HOFMANN: Well, first of all, it could be that WestLB receives no recovery on account of its

claim because its claim, as I understand it, is a breach of contract claim. To establish a breach of contract claim, you have to establish that you, yourself, didn't breach the contract. And I think that the allegations read in the Complaint would suggest that WestLB breached its contract and, therefore, is not entitled to a breach of contract claim against the estate.

With respect to the Bay North claim, which is in the millions and millions of dollars, evidently, I know there is also very active litigation against Bay North. And is it assured that Bay North will receive something? No, I don't think so under the current litigation. So that is how my client gets possibly something.

But, your Honor -- and this ties in very closely obviously to the standing issue -- under Section 1109 of the bankruptcy code, equity expressly has standing. There is no question about it. The only question is, who is equity? Is equity the 51 percent of equity represented by my client and Mr. Wilson's client who is here telling you they do not support the plan? Or is equity controlled by the very proponents of the plan that would wipe them out? I think that there are clear conflicts of interest at

work here, and I think the Court heard Mr. Shoaf testify that he had not even considered the interests of Mezzanine and Holdings in determining whether to cast a ballot on behalf of them in support of the plan. I think that is a breach of fiduciary duty.

Now, unquestionably, Mr. Shoaf has a duty to act on behalf of the best interests of Easy Street Partners. No question about it. The problem is that that duty is fundamentally at variance with his duty as -- on behalf of the equity holders downstream.

And under those circumstances, especially where you have 51 percent of equity advising the Court they do not support the plan, well, my question: How is this debtor actually proposing this plan? How does the authority exist to propose the plan? I think that is a question that we're certainly not going to answer today, but it raises questions as to the debtor's good faith.

I don't believe this plan is proposed in good faith. It's an effort to railroad through a release of the estate's claims against WestLB. This is the very company -- WestLB or the bad bank, one or the other -- that through its own conduct is the architect of the debtor's demise, and I think it would be inequitable to approve a plan that releases

them and absolves the bad bank of its responsibility for the failure of the debtor's business. Thank you.

MR. BLUMENTHAL: Your Honor, I have a few brief comments.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BLUMENTHAL: First of all, not to belabor the point regarding PC I, Easy Street
Partners released WestLB under the cash collateral stipulation in an order upon notice. PC I didn't object then. All the plans on file provided that they received nothing. They never objected. They never called. They never said anything. The voting issue is a red herring because they have always been deemed to reject a plan. And, frankly -- which was admitted even under the prior plans under the stipulation between WestLB and the committee, if they supported the plan, which, they've been on notice forever, since it was filed, the -- they would dismiss the Complaint and release.

And I would submit that Sky Lodge is not a truck full of rotting strawberries but it is, proverbially, a melting ice cube. This company, as Mr. Shoaf testified, is running out of cash. If this plan is not confirmed, that hotel will ultimately shut down.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

We do have exigent circumstances confronting this debtor. Fourth of July weekend is coming up -- a very big season, a very big time of year. And so the -- and PC I was never entitled to vote, so the modifications under the code only deal with re-soliciting votes of those who were entitled to vote. We haven't heard one complaint from any of the creditors.

You know, I just want to address briefly, your Honor, some of Mr. Wilson's statements. I would really ask the Court just to consider what the evidence is before you. There has been a lot of throwing around the word "bad faith." Well, Mr. Shoaf negotiated with the committee, the unsecured creditors, Jacobson, WestLB. He dealt with the homeowners. This is not Mr. Shoaf's plan, as Mr. Wilson indicated. It's an amalgam of almost a year of interaction and negotiation among all the constituents in this case who were in the money. the fact that there is an subordination agreement that contractually subordinates the claims of Management and Development is a totally different issue and has absolutely nothing to do with good faith. And I think, your Honor, the -- and first -second of all, the claims of Management and

Development are actually 2.8 million, including a rejection of damage claim. So he is actually wrong on the amount of the claims.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And I think, your Honor, actually in your colloquy with Mr. Wilson is -- was correct. Mr. Shoaf is not getting paid under the employment agreement for anything in the past. He's getting paid for services in the future by WestLB, not for "whatever," which was the word that Kim Wilson used, but for his services going forward. The only evidence is that his continued employment is necessary for the continued feasibility of the reorganized debtor. He has become, in essence, the centerpiece of the Sky Lodge Hotel. If he was just to be discarded, frankly, this reorganized debtor would have a very difficult time to struggle through the next couple of years. It would be a loss of continuity. And by the way, I'm sure if Mr. Wickline brought in people who could buy the unsold units, he could negotiate finder's fees with WestLB if he actually did some work for a change. And, again, everyone is complaining about -- it sounds like when my kids were two-year-olds, frankly. What I used to tell them, frankly, is, "Don't stamp your feet unless you have something to really stamp your feet about."

1 I call it sort of this is like a crybaby 2 objection. It's sort of like, "I'm not getting 3 anything, so no one should get anything." That is 4 basically their objection. It's sort of sour grapes, 5 et cetera. No one is -- and this plan, if there was 6 ever a plan that was proposed in good faith, that 7 is -- that is this particular plan. There was no 8 shifting or transferring of liquor licenses. You can 9 not transfer liquor licenses. That was never an 10 asset of the estate. There was only evidence of one 11 liquor license. But, again, it would not have made 12 one iota of difference where the liquor licenses 13 stayed because they would need to be turned in. And, 14 frankly, if they were still in management, those 15 liquor licenses would be over upon the signing of a 16 confirmation order, which, in essence, rejects those 17 agreements. So I would submit to the Court that all 18 the -- the two objections, again, are misplaced, 19 Not one support of evidence for their cries 20 of bad faith. This plan, and the evidence supports, 21 was proposed in good faith and we ask that you 22 confirm the plan. 23 MR. HAVEL: Just a few supplementary 24 Comments, your Honor. Regarding the arguments by 25 Mr. Wilson for Wickline, I would just make two

observations and arguments. First is, I had in my opening comment said, there was absolutely no evidence submitted by Wickline to support the kind of general arguments they made in their objection papers. Mr. Wilson, in his argument at closing, reinforces that there is no evidence, and instead asks your Honor to take wholly speculative, unjustified, and quite frankly, not supported by the law, leaps to find some sort of support for his argument. And there is only two, and I'll focus on them quickly.

First, he repeats the allegations about the liquor license movement being a conduct that harms Mr. Wickline and his ownership of Management and that then, therefore, transfers over to a bad faith proposal of the entire plan because Mr. Shoaf is getting some benefit. That itself is clearly a very disputed and murky area, and I don't think there has been any competent evidence by Wickline to show that that is, in fact, the case.

But then Mr. Wilson asked your Honor to take a wholly unjustified and unsupportable leap, which is because we are a co-plan proponent, we automatically share the taint of that bad faith and it is our bad faith as well, which is not the case.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

We have through the record and the facts shown that this has been an arm's-length extensive negotiations and that these plan terms have been developed over a fair amount of time with a lot of give and take.

Secondly, there was this attempt to confuse or ignore the fact that the new hard money equity is being put in by a WestLB affiliate or related entity and that the restructure of its debt is a separate and important step in the plan, but separate. And Mr. Wilson then again suggested to your Honor, well, they are both kind of going to be in this family, and we all know that when things are in a family, there is a merger of interests. quite frankly, that is exactly the wrong statement. We all know that if there are two entities in an affiliated relationship, as long as they are separate entities and treated as such, there is no merger. merger is an extraordinary remedy that you have to get to by showing facts. And so, again, he asked your Honor to take a leap which he doesn't put in the record and to take a leap that is not supported by the facts that are before you. Again, this all supports the fact that there is just no basis for these allegations in the Wickline objections.

As to the responses by Park City I, just a

couple of factual things. WestLB has not, quote, "tightened the spigot" and shut this business down. If the attorney for Park City I knew the facts a little more carefully, he would know that there has always been 3.2 million of cash collateral. There has been a standing budget for office expenses. And the only cry WestLB has been making, and it's been since March, is, "Let's get this case over because the money is getting lower and lower." We have come in and three or four times suggested we are running out of money. We are not tightening the spigot. We don't control the budget. We have not stopped providing money for the budget. And so to suggest we are creating the crisis is wrong. We've try to avert the crisis instead of create it.

The other comment about the closing argument by Mr. Hofmann, I think he finally did acknowledge what is going on here for his client when he said something to the effect of, "Well, we just want possibly something. This is possibly our last hope for something."

Well, what he is really telling your Honor is that he is out of the money. He wants to speculate with other people's monies and other people's rights to try and exploit a very difficult

and a very speculative lawsuit with the hopes that maybe something would flow up to him. Well, he is not the party who has to make the hard decision about whether to spend the money of the estate or get more money for the estate and take the chance that it's going to be successful. So his protestations are like the businessman who is already out of money and says, "Well, I guess I'll go to Vegas and roll the dice. Now, I'm using the bank's or I'm using the creditor's money to do that, but I guess that's okay."

That is what they are doing here by asking you to give any credence to their argument that these lawsuits have to be preserved for their benefit, when the people who really have an interest in the potential benefit of these lawsuits have agreed to dismiss them in a settlement as part of a plan that is very fair and may even be very generous.

THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will take a brief recess.

THE BAILIFF: All rise.

(Recess from 3:25 until 4:23 p.m.)

THE BAILIFF: All rise. Court resumes in

session. Please be seated.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

## RULING OF THE COURT

THE COURT: This case is before the Court on unusual circumstances and shortened notice in an expedited hearing. The objecting parties argue that this an indication of bad faith and strong-arm tactics by WestLB. Given the history of this case, these circumstances can just as easily be construed as an indication of good faith. The plan that is before the Court is a collaborative effort between the debtor, WestLB, the unsecured creditors committee, Jacobson, and fractional unit owners, who all support the plan. The objecting parties are either, one, parties who hold an equity interest but not a direct equity interest in the debtor. parties have no right to vote on the plan, which right to vote is held by Easy Street Mezzanine and, therefore, these parties have no standing.

The Court will hereafter refer to these parties as the equity objectors.

The second party -- parties objecting to the confirmation in the hearing are parties who have an equity interest in unsecured creditors who are insiders and subject to an express subrogation agreement. I will refer to these parties as objecting creditors.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The objecting parties argue that this expedited procedure has deprived them of due process. Because the equity objectors do not have standing with respect to voting in this plan, there is no denial of due process since they have no right to be heard. The objecting creditors, as the Court stated, are subject to an express subrogation agreement. Their claims under the amended plan were effectively subrogated to WestLB and unsecured creditors and under the current plan, their claims are expressly subrogated. Subrogation agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy cases and the subrogation agreement is presumptively valid. Other than vague assertions that the agreement is unenforceable, the Court has no credible evidence that gives rise to any defenses with respect to the subrogation agreements.

The creditor objectors, the parties to the subrogation agreement, is aware of the subrogation agreements and the Court finds that there is no denial of due process to the objecting creditors with respect to this expedited hearing.

Objecting equity -- or the equity objectors, although without standing, argue that the litigation against WestLB may result in recovery on their part. This is not so. The debtor waived

claims against the debtor in its initial -- in the initial cash collateral hearing, which this Court approved. At that time, the release of claims was addressed by the Court. There were no objections to the release of claims by the debtor against WestlB, and as such, the release was approved.

The plan is not releasing claims of the debtor or the estate. The claim being settled is the claim of the committee, and although the committee claim asserts an avoidance action, that claim was waived. The only claim the committee has is limited to subrogation. Consequently, there would be no recovery passing on to equity because of that litigation.

Because this is not a claim of the debtor or the estate that is being compromised or doesn't believe that it's subject to what are commonly referred to as the Copexa factors, but nevertheless, the committee has presented the Court with evidence of the Copexa factors, which would be applicable to the settlement in this case.

The objecting parties also assert that the plan is not proposed in good faith. The arguments that the plan is proposed in bad faith or without good faith concentrate on either of compensation to

Mr. Shoaf or the actions of WestLB that have been characterized as strong-armed tactics. The Court notes from the history and background of this case that WestLB did not precipitate the filing of this case. The emergency giving rise to these unusual circumstances has not been precipitated by WestLB other than WestLB's indulgence of the debtor's efforts to obtain alternative financing. Evidence before the Court is that the debtor was unable to find any alternative financing and, hence, the only alternative for reorganization was for WestLB to participate as an alternative financier.

Compensation to Mr. Shoaf is for future services. Although the suggestion is that this compensation is excessive, there has been no evidence that the compensation is, in fact, excessive, that it is out of line with previous compensation or that the compensation adversely impacts creditors. Any claims that Mr. Wickline or his related or controlled entities may have against Mr. Shoaf are not compromised under this plan. If Mr. Wickline believes there has been a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to him, he is at liberty to pursue those actions. But a plan proposing to pay creditors, which is supported by creditors, is not filed in bad

faith or proposed in bad faith simply because management or future management is compensated in an amount that is excessive in the view of an adverse party. What we have before the Court is a plan that has been worked out by the parties who have a financial stake in the outcome and all have compromised.

The property of the estate is valued at \$20,600,000. The secured claim of WestLB is approximately \$17,900,000. The secured claim of Jacobson Construction is approximately \$1,700,000. Administrative and priority expenses exceed one million dollars and unsecured claims are approximately one million dollars.

These are the parties who have a financial stake in the outcome of this case, and they have all voted to accept the plan. The plan is facilitated by WestLB contributing additional capital in exchange for equity. Based on all of the circumstances and the evidence presented to the Court, the objection of Park City I and of Mr. Wickline and his related entities are overruled. The Court finds that the debtor has met -- the debtor and WestLB have met the requirements of the bankruptcy code for confirmation and the plan will be confirmed.

Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Cannon, you may prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Court's ruling.

MR. CANNON: Thank you, your Honor, and I raise this only because I am very prone to do this; the Court referred a number of times to a subrogation agreement, and I think the Court meant subordination agreement.

THE COURT: The Court did mean subordination agreement. So I apologize for that.

The remaining matters before the Court, I believe, are all applications for compensation.

Other than the application of the Wrona Law firm, the Court is unaware of any objections to compensation that have been filed. Are there are objections that have been filed?

MR. CANNON: Your Honor, there are objections to the applications of Mr. Wrona and Mr. Gordon. There are no objections -- there is a reservations of rights, I believe, with respect to all the applications. There are objections filed by Gateway to Mr. Wrona's and Mr. Gordon's applications which have been joined in by the committee on a limited basis and maybe there weren't any on an unlimited basis.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

194

All right. Well, with respect THE COURT: to the applications of -- the application of the Wrona Law Firm, if I understand it, the objection is that the Wrona Law Firm represented Mr. Shoaf at the same time that he was representing the debtor; is that correct? Mr. Wrona, if you want to --

MR. WRONA: Thank you, your Honor. happened in March, one of my roles as special counsel for the debtor is to handle media relations. was a lawsuit filed and I was asked on behalf of the debtor to take a look at the lawsuit. We thought that there was going to be a story in the Park Record. As I got involved, then the debtor asked me to basically increase my involvement and asked me to determine if we could obtain some kind of extension because we were coming up on the last sweet spot of the season for the project, which is spring break.

I contacted Gateway Center and asked if I could obtain an extension, and quite admittedly, I said, "Look, Mr. Shoaf and Cloud 9 would like me to get this extension." They agreed to that extension.

They then contacted me three days later and said, "Look, we're willing to enter into a stay of the state court action." They prepared the stay, and I signed it on behalf of Mr. Shoaf and Cloud 9.

So I think it is fair to say on those couple acts, I was asked by the debtor to undertake those acts, but I was engaging in representation of both Mr. Shoaf and Cloud 9 and the debtor. And so, you know, to the extent there was a violation of the speed limit, if you will, your Honor, I hope the Court views it as going a couple of miles an hour over the speed limit.

THE COURT: Well, if I were to view it as miles over the speed limit, how many miles -- in other words, how many dollars did you devote to --

MR. WRONA: I submitted something to the court -- and I was -- I erred really on the side of Gateway. My actual involvement on behalf of Mr. Shoaf was probably less than hour, but I looked at my billing records and what I reported to the court was two and a half hours of time, which is \$875.

THE COURT: And when did that occur?

MR. WRONA: Looking at my billing records,
the -- I guess the critical acts, one I think was
April 5th, if I'm not mistaken, and that is when I
reached out to Gateway and asked for the extension.
Then on April the 8th was when I engaged in a
telephone conversation with a Gateway attorney and

```
1
      they suggested the stay. Then on April the 13th,
2
      Gateway sent me the stipulation and the letter asking
3
      me to sign it.
4
                  It's interesting, they are objecting to
5
      the fee and it was Gateway that was actually
6
      requesting that I sign the stay and I did that.
7
                  So that April 13th entry, it looks like
8
      two-tenths of an hour. The April 8th entry is
9
      six-tenths of an hour, and I didn't even charge
10
      actually for the April 5th email that I sent because
11
      it was a matter of minutes.
12
                  THE COURT: All right. So the -- I'm
13
      sorry -- you don't happen to know the docket number
14
      on your application, do you?
15
                  MR. WRONA:
                              Judge, I don't know if I have
16
```

that in front of me. I had it here on Friday.

THE COURT: Oh, here, I found it. So you are seeking -- total compensation being requested is 34,715?

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. WRONA: Correct. And a lot of that money -- a lot of those fees were generated quite some time ago because obviously my firm has never been fully compensated really going back to, I think, last fall. Yeah, I think it's \$34,718, if I'm not mistaken -- \$34,717.50.

1 THE COURT: Well, it -- unfortunately, 2 Mr. Wrona, it's a little more than just going over 3 the speed limit. I mean, the Court has a long 4 history and a pretty consistent and clear case law 5 that the counsel for the debtor cannot at the same 6 time represent principals of the debtor. 7 this case, you were employed as special counsel? 8 MR. WRONA: That's correct. I'm an alien 9 to bankruptcy court. That was part of the problem. 10 THE COURT: Well, that is no excuse, 11 Mr. Wrona. 12 MR. WRONA: Understood. 13 THE COURT: I think it does allow the 14 Court some leniency if you are acting as special 15 counsel as opposed to general counsel. So I'm going 16 to -- let me hear from Mr. Payne and see what amount 17 he believes was at issue. 18 MR. PAYNE: Thank you, Judge. Your Honor, 19 Doug Payne for Gateway Center, LC. I think that the 20 fee application of Mr. Wrona indicates that on March 21 15th he spent one half an hour reviewing the copy of 22 the state law complaint, correspondence with Bill, 23 presumably Shoaf, on the same, a telephone conference 24 with Mr. Shoaf on how it impacts members of Easy 25 Street. And then in paragraph -- that is paragraph

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

nine that goes on March 24th, there is time entries on March 29, April 8th -- that is a telephone conference with Mr. Crocket of my office about the state court lawsuit. And then paragraphs 12 and 13, there are other time entries that total 4.4 hours, your Honor.

But what is troubling about this is that this lawsuit was not against the debtor, your Honor. It was against Cloud 9 Resorts, LLC, which I think is an insider of the debtor and against Mr. Shoaf, individually. It was on their obligations under a lease as the original obligator, lessee, Cloud 9 Resorts, LLC and Mr. Shoaf as guarantor. And by this time, the debtor had rejected the lease. Not only was the debtor not a party, the debtor had rejected the lease in January when the debtor failed to assume or reject the lien within the 120 days. So I don't know that it's appropriate for the bankruptcy estate to be billed for advising the debtor -- for someone advising the debtor about how a lawsuit impacts members of the debtors or potential disputes between members, which is what some of these time entries indicate. On April 21st, telephone conference on Gateway litigation, Bay North and other issues. April 20th, working on how to keep Easy Street

members out of Gateway litigation.

I just don't think that is an appropriate use of the debtor's funds, and I think it indicates that Mr. Wrona was not disinterested. And I don't think that that should be allowed, and that would total 4.4 hours, but I think there is a question:

Did he lose his disinterested status?

THE COURT: Well, and I think that because he's special counsel, it does allow me a little more leniency because he doesn't have the same pervasive disinterested requirements. And so what I'm going to do is I will approve fees except for those that are detailed in Mr. Payne's objection and those fees will be disallowed.

And I guess we have Mr. Gordon's?

MR. GORDON: Yes, your Honor. Your Honor, what occurred in my case, I was approached in the spring of last year and asked to represent the Sky Lodge in its dispute with the Gateway Center and the lease. In the initial phases of that, it was indicated that the client was Cloud 9 Resorts, which I understood to be the managing entity of the Sky Lodge. Three or four months later, I was told that the Sky Lodge was declaring bankruptcy and was asked to continue in acting as counsel for the Sky Lodge

and represent it in the bankruptcy. And so I was appointed as special counsel for that one limited purpose and continued forward in representing the interests of Easy Street Partners.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

It was not until March 15th that in an attempt of service of the Complaint mentioned, that Mr. Wrona took care of, wherein there was service upon Bill Shoaf and Cloud 9 Resorts, and Gateway wanted me to accept service to that. At that time, I looked closely at that and did not understood -- I understood that Easy Street and Cloud 9 were the managerial entities involved. I recognized that there was not a conflict of interest as to the lease. The factual allegations between Easy Street Partners and Gateway, and Cloud 9 and Gateway were identical. The only issue would be that if, in fact, Bill Shoaf or Cloud 9 lost in their state claim, there was the potential for a contribution claim back against Easy Street Partners. So at that point, I did what I would normally do in a civil case when I recognized that there was a possibility of a conflict. I got a consent waiver, talked to my clients, and then moved forward.

A formal objection to my fee application did not come until April 23rd, which was just two

days before we actually held the two-day evidentiary hearing before your Honor on the issue of whether the Gateway lease was legitimate or not, and so did I not have time to address it at that time. Once we got through the evidentiary hearing, I spoke with Ken Canyon, who has helped me tremendously through the ins and outs of bankruptcy law, and he indicated to me that I needed to file a supplemental disclosure, which I did at that time, explaining the situation.

I would like to point out to the Court that every ounce of work -- really, the question for the Court is this: Had Partners prevailed in its objection to Gateway's claim, would it have benefited the bankruptcy estate? And the answer is absolutely yes. Gateway's claim was for \$113,000 and Partners was primarily liable on the lease for that amount.

As seen in the evidentiary hearing on this matter, Partners felt strongly that the lease had been violated and that it owed nothing to Gateway, and prevailing on the objection would have done away with a large claim that would have freed up capital to pay other creditors.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Payne, wasn't -- I guess the question I have is, is there work that was done for Cloud 9 or Bill Shoaf that

would not have been done in objecting -- in representing the estate in this matter? I mean, Mr. Gordon was employed specifically for this reason, and the fact that Mr. Shoaf and Cloud 9 might have been liable on the lease as well, I don't know that that should disqualify Mr. Gordon.

MR. PAYNE: Well, your Honor, that was not disclosed, and certainly the attach -- one of the attachments to our objection was Mr. Gordon saying he represented Cloud 9 Resorts, LC. Certainly he knew that was a separate entity that had liability or responsibility under the lease prior to accepting his engagement as special counsel.

And I think that the question before the Court is: Was he -- did he hold an interest -- or hold or represent an interest adverse to the debtor or the estate on the matter of which he was employed? And I think the answer to that is yes because he had represented Cloud 9 --

THE COURT: Why would his interest be adverse?

MR. PAYNE: Well, there would be claims for contribution, plus, your Honor, I don't think it's necessarily --

THE COURT: Well, but he didn't represent

them in those claims, right?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Not during the bankruptcy, I MR. PAYNE: But I guess the question is: Would the interests of Mr. Shoaf and Cloud 9, were they congruous with the interests of the estate? I don't think they were completely, your Honor. For example, it was probably in the interest of the guarantor, Mr. Shoaf, and the initial lessee under the lease for the debtor not to -- not to quickly reject the lease so that the debtor's obligations under the administrative claim would pay for, perhaps, four months of rent under lease. And, in fact, that is what happened here. It may have been in the best interest of the estate for that to be quickly In fact, the debtor didn't intend to use the space, which is what the debtor has represented. But, in fact, that went for the entire 120 days and was rejected as a matter of law. If, of course, that is paid from the bankruptcy estate as an administrative claim, that would reduce the exposure of Mr. Shoaf and of Cloud 9 Resorts.

And Mr. Gordon was engaged specifically to deal with the lease and the debtor took no action to reject the lease. They said the debtor tried to litigate it on the merits of the lease, claiming

1 there was some type of constructive eviction. 2 don't think that the interest of the estate and of 3 the other obligated parties that were -- parties who 4 were obligated to the Gateway Center were congruous, 5 your Honor. I think there is an adverse interest, 6 and I don't think that he's entitled to be 7 compensated. 8 THE COURT: Well, I guess the question I 9 have is, if it's not congruous, does that mean that 10 it's not disinterested, I guess? 11 MR. PAYNE: I think it's adverse. Ιf 12 there is a differentiation between --13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MR. PAYNE: That would be my 15 interpretation and argument. 16 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that the --17 I think on the matter that Mr. Gordon was employed, 18 what he did was within the scope of his employment. 19 I understand your argument that there might be some 20 benefit for the debtor to occupy the premises. But 21 under the circumstances, I'm going to find that 22 Mr. Gordon, as special counsel, was not -- did not 23 have an adverse interest on the matter for which he 24 was employed and I'll allow the fees. 25 With respect to all the other fees, with

1 the reservation of rights that WestLB has requested, 2 the fees will be allowed. 3 MR. CANNON: Thank you, your Honor. This 4 is one matter with respect to the order, and I don't 5 want into Judge Boulden's celebration of her time on 6 the bench. 7 We have an order prepared. We're going to 8 revise it based on the Court's ruling today. 9 anticipate being prepared to circulate it and file it 10 tomorrow. The only concern the debtor has is that 11 there is a -- the funding commitment deadline request 12 is Friday, July 2nd. I hope that if it were 13 necessary, it could be extended, but I don't know 14 that. And so what we would like to do is try to find 15 a way to get the order reviewed and entered by 16 Friday. 17 THE COURT: Well. Local Rule 9021 states, 18 "Unless otherwise provided herein or directed by the 19 Court," so I'm going to waive the requirements of 20 Rule 9021 as far as approval by counsel. 21 MR. CANNON: Thank you, your Honor. We'll 22 submit it by midday tomorrow. 23 So I guess if the THE COURT: Fine. 24 parties will -- if you will be sure to give all 25 parties electronic notice, Mr. Cannon, so that,

	·
1	knowing that I've waived the requirements of the
2	rule, if anybody does have an objection, they will
3	need to promptly file the objection.
4	MR. WILSON: Mr. Hofmann and I will be in
5	this courtroom at noon and if you
6	THE COURT: So alert your staff.
7	MR. WILSON: Meet midday or drop us off a
8	copy here, would you?
9	MR. CANNON: We'll bring a copy down here.
10	MR. WILSON: Awesome. Thank you.
11	THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
12	everyone. Court is in recess.
13	THE BAILIFF: All arise.
14	(The hearing concluded at 4:52 p.m.)
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF UTAH )
4	COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
5	
6	I, Jennifer E. Garner, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for
7	the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
8	That on July 6, 2010, I transcribed an
9	electronic sound recording at the request of Attorney Annette Jarvis;
10	T
11	That the statements and testimony of all speakers were reported by me in stenotype and
12	thereafter transcribed, and that a full, true, and correct transcription of said statements and
13	testimony is set forth in the preceding pages, according to my ability to hear and understand the
14	electronic sound recording provided;
15	That the original transcript was sealed and delivered to Attorney Annette Jarvis for
16	safekeeping.
17	I further certify that I am not kin or otherwise associated with any of the parties to said
18	cause of action and that I am not interested in the outcome thereof.
19	NITHECO MY HAND AND OFFICIAL CEAL this Cth
20	WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL this 6th day of July, 2010.
21	
22	
23	Jennifer E. Garner, CSR, RPR
24	NOTARY PUBLIC  JENNIFER E. GARNER  Residing in Summit County
25	COMMISSION EXPIRES MARCH 31, 2013 STATE OF UTAH